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POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS 
UNDER SECTIONS 15 AND 7 
OF THE CHARTER: 
A COMMENT ON 
GOSSELIN V. QUÉBEC 
Jamie Cameron* 
I. LINGERING DOUBTS 
From the outset, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms has had its 
detractors.1 Today it is predictable, and healthy too, for commentators to debate 
judicial review’s consequences for parliamentary government. The Charter’s 
significance should not be understated: just as individuals became entitled to 
challenge actions by the state which interfere with their liberty, courts acquired 
the authority to enforce those entitlements against the democratic branches of 
government. Still, the Supreme Court of Canada declared, in the early years of 
Charter interpretation, that the adjudication of constitutional rights “must be 
approached free of any lingering doubts as to its legitimacy.”2 
Despite that pronouncement, the Court realizes that doubts persist and are an 
adjunct of the institutional tension that accompanies judicial review. The 
tension can surface when a “negative” remedy invalidates a legislative 
provision that violates the Charter, but is aggravated by claims which seek to 
impose positive obligations on governments, or which otherwise displace 
economic and social policy. Claims of that nature pose a dilemma for courts. 
On the merits, they may be as compelling as other entitlements which can be 
enforced by a negative order limiting the government’s authority. At the same 
                                                                                                                                                              
*  Professor of Law at Osgoode Hall Law School. 
1
  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11. 
2
  Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at 497 [hereinafter “Motor Vehicle Ref-
erence” or “Motor Vehicle”]. 
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time, the legitimacy of review is most vulnerable when the exercise of judicial 
power interferes with functions that are dedicated to the representative branches 
of government. In such instances it is uncertain whether the claim should 
prevail on substantive grounds or fail for institutional reasons. 
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not been hesitant to recognize positive 
rights and impose positive obligations under the Charter.3 Though the judges 
are aware of limits on their powers of review, the question of institutional 
boundaries has played a minor role in this jurisprudence. It is the merits of 
claims, rather than doubts about the legitimacy of review, that determine the 
outcome in these cases. Gosselin v. Québec, which tested the constitutionality 
of Québec’s welfare policy, provides a recent example of the Court’s tendency 
to subordinate institutional considerations to the question of entitlement.4  
There, the question was provoked by the province’s two tier social assistance 
program, which reduced the benefits payable to those under the age of 30 to a 
fraction of what those over 30 were entitled to receive. Younger welfare 
recipients could become eligible for nearly equivalent benefits, though, by 
participating in prescribed incentive programs.5 The issue for the Court was 
whether this age-based differential for benefits violated sections 15 or 7 of the 
Charter. On its face, the program singled welfare recipients out for unequal 
treatment on the basis of their age, which is one of section 15’s prohibited 
                                                                                                                                                              
3
  See Schacter v. Canada, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 679 (invalidating unemployment benefits which 
were underinclusive because “natural” parents were not given the same benefits as adoptive par-
ents); Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 (declaring that it was 
unconstitutional for the province’s health care services not to provide sign language interpretation 
and directing the government to comply with s. 15’s requirements); Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 
S.C.R. 493 (adding “sexual orientation” to the prohibited grounds of discrimination in the prov-
ince’s human rights legislation); Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of 
Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 S.C.R.181 [hereinafter “Provincial Judges Reference”] (holding 
that the provinces are constitutionally obligated to establish independent commissions to address 
the question of judicial remuneration); New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Ser-
vices) v. G. (J.), [1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 (imposing a positive obligation on governments, under s. 7 of 
the Charter, to provide state-funded counsel, in certain circumstances, for child custody proceed-
ings), and Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016 (imposing an affirmative 
obligation on Ontario to protect the meaningful exercise of agricultural workers’ freedom of 
association under s. 2(d) of the Charter). See also Auton (Guardian ad Litem of) v. British Colum-
bia (Attorney General) (2002), 220 D.L.R. (4th) 411 (B.C.C.A.); leave to appeal granted May 15, 
2003, [2002] S.C.C.A No. 510 (ordering the province to fund specified medical treatment for 
children suffering from autism). 
4
  2002 SCC 84. 
5
  The base amount of welfare payable to those under age 30 was roughly one-third of the 
base amount payable to those 30 and over. Under a scheme introduced in 1984 and since repealed, 
those under 30 could increase their welfare payments, over and above the basic entitlement, to 
nearly the same level as those ages 30 and over. Increased benefits were conditional, however, on 
participation in one of three training programs. 
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grounds of discrimination. The section 7 claim was more innovative. Under that 
guarantee, the applicant maintained that Québec’s failure to provide minimum 
benefits to those under age 30 violated section 7’s security of the person. In 
either case, the question was whether the Charter required Québec to provide 
equal or adequate benefits.  
Five of the Court’s nine judges wrote to explain their conception of the 
applicant’s entitlement in this case.6 Though it is tempting to address their 
differences of opinion, doing so would deflect attention from the question of 
institutional boundaries, when the purpose of this article is to explain why the 
Court’s avoidance of that question is problematic. In this, it should be 
recognized that the constitutional status of positive rights and obligations raises 
“irksome” issues.7 These entitlements cannot be excluded from the Charter, but 
nor can the questions they raise be ignored. In the circumstances, Gosselin v. 
Québec provides an opportunity to explore the interpretative challenges those 
issues present. The inquiry begins by reviewing the status of institutional 
boundaries in the jurisprudence prior to Gosselin. In discussing the Court’s 
analysis of the right to equal or adequate welfare benefits, the next part 
comments on the Chief Justice’s majority opinion in Gosselin, which dismissed 
the applicant’s claim under sections 15 and 7. In doing so, it explains how she 
warped the definition of equality to avoid conducting a section 1 analysis and 
addressing the institutional considerations at stake. Thereafter, it discusses 
Arbour J.’s dissent, which proposed an extraordinary theory of positive rights 
under section 7. Despite its far-reaching consequences for the legitimacy of 
review, Arbour J.’s support for rights of performance under section 7 also 
failed to address the institutional considerations at stake.8  
Taken together, the Court’s five opinions create the impression that the 
substantive entitlement was not only determinative, but the exclusive issue at 
stake. Yet the fundamental question in Gosselin was not whether the age 
distinction infringed the applicant’s right to equality or security of the person. 
More to the point, the issue was whether the Court’s mandate includes the 
power to set constitutional standards for the distribution of welfare benefits. 
                                                                                                                                                              
6
  Chief Justice McLachlin’s majority opinion upholding the program under ss. 15 and 7 was 
joined by Gonthier, Iacobucci, Major and Binnie JJ.; a minority of four, comprising L’Heureux-
Dubé, Bastarache, Arbour, and LeBel JJ. found it unconstitutional under s. 15; Arbour and 
L’Heureux-Dubé JJ. alone found that the program also violated s. 7 of the Charter. 
7
  Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803) (explaining the delicacy of the Court’s 
task when legal issues create confrontations between the branches of government). 
8
  Justice Bastarache also wrote a substantial opinion, in dissent from the majority opinion’s 
s. 15 analysis, and in disagreement with Arbour J.’s theory of s. 7. Though his judgment is not 
considered separately, his comments on the reasons of the Chief Justice and Arbour J. are included 
in the analysis of their opinions. 
68  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Job name: SCLR vol 20   CRA             Date: Tuesday, March 06, 2012 
That issue was inherent in Gosselin’s claim, and unavoidable as a result. It can 
be noted, in this regard, that boundaries limit the scope of review and, in doing 
so, guard its legitimacy. To pretend that there are no boundaries, or to ignore 
their presence — as the Court did in Gosselin — can only place the legitimacy 
of review at risk. In developing that theme, the paper concludes by explaining 
why institutional considerations must inform the Court’s analysis of positive 
rights and obligations under the Charter. 
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARIES OF REVIEW 
The judiciary’s mandate to enforce constitutional rights is based on an 
understanding that there are institutional boundaries, or limits, on the power of 
the courts. Where those boundaries should be placed and how they should be 
defined are questions that defy answer. Even so, two observations can be 
offered. First, the legitimacy of review is dependent on a concept or theory of 
institutional role. To put it another way, the Supreme Court’s authority to 
enforce rights rests on a concept of function that separates and distinguishes the 
respective responsibilities of the courts and legislatures. Second, it follows 
from that assumption of separate functions that the legitimacy of review is 
weakest when the exercise of judicial power threatens to cross the boundaries 
that distinguish the branches of government. 
The Supreme Court has been aware, from the beginning, of boundaries on its 
power of review under the Charter. Yet it has also been determined not to 
renege on its promise that the Charter’s rights would receive a “generous rather 
than a legalistic” interpretation, and one which would secure for individuals the 
full benefit of the Charter’s protection.9 Respecting those boundaries without 
shortchanging the Charter’s entitlements has not been an easy goal for the 
Court to achieve. In this, the Motor Vehicle Reference is instructive.10 Unless 
qualified, the Court’s substantive interpretation of section 7 could grant 
individuals unlimited protection from government interference with their 
liberty and security interests. That view of the guarantee ignored the intent of 
its framers and brought the cautionary tale of the American due process clause 
to the forefront. Having provoked fears that section 7 could be invoked against 
all manner of legislative policy, Lamer J. explained why the Motor Vehicle 
Reference stayed within the institutional boundaries of review. 
He recognized that to preserve the legitimacy of review it was necessary to 
constrain the scope of section 7. To pre-empt critics of the decision, he declared 
that the Motor Vehicle Reference did not invite the courts to “decide upon the 
                                                                                                                                                              
9
  R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, at 344. 
10
  Supra, note 2. 
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appropriateness of policies underlying legislative enactments,” because the 
scope of the guarantee would be limited to matters pertaining to the 
administration of justice.11 Justice Lamer derived this constraint from the 
relationship between section 7 and sections 8 to 14, which convinced him that 
the administration of justice was the concern of the Charter’s “Legal Rights.” It 
made sense to him that section 7 should be given a similar interpretation. As a 
result, the Motor Vehicle Reference held that the fundamental justice clause 
qualifies the otherwise unlimited substantive scope of life, liberty and security 
of the person. This reading of the guarantee served important institutional 
purposes. By confining the scope of section 7 to the justice system, it allowed 
Lamer J. to forge a distinction between the judicial domain and the realm of 
general public policy.  
As he explained, granting section 7 a substantive interpretation did not cross 
institutional boundaries because the guarantee’s principles “do not lie in the 
realm of general public policy but in the inherent domain of the judiciary as 
guardian of the justice system.”12 In this, he was confident that the inherent 
domain principle would provide “meaningful content for the section 7 
guarantee all the while avoiding adjudication of policy matters.”13 Moreover, by 
characterizing sections 8 to 14 as instances or illustrations of section 7’s more 
general guarantee of fundamental justice, all of which he described as 
“essential elements of a system for the administration of justice,” he reinforced 
the claim that section 7 was concerned with justice, not policy.14 
Justice Lamer’s concurring reasons in the Prostitution Reference further 
entrenched the Motor Vehicle’s distinction between matters of justice, which 
fell within the “acceptable sphere of judicial activity,”15 and policy issues, 
which did not. Specifically, he discouraged the lower courts from recognizing 
social and economic entitlements by warning that “[t]he courts must not, 
because of the nature of the institution, be involved in the realm of pure public 
policy.”16 That, he acknowledged, is the “exclusive” role of the elected 
representatives, and added that to expand the scope of section 7 too widely 
would infringe upon that role.17 The Motor Vehicle Reference may have given 
section 7 a substantive interpretation, but it was one that was limited to the 
administration of justice and did not include economic rights or other 
                                                                                                                                                              
11
  Id., at 496. 
12
  Id., at 503. 
13
  Id. 
14
  Id., at 503. 
15
  Id., at 504. 
16
  Reference re ss. 193 and 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (Man.) [hereinafter “Prostitu-
tion Reference”], [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1123, at 1176 (concurring opinion) (emphasis added). 
17
  Id. 
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entitlements which fell within the realm of “general public policy dealing with 
broader social, political and moral issues.”18 
This conception of the guarantee was predicated on the assumption that, as 
long as judicial power of review was bounded by the inherent domain criterion, 
the legitimacy of review would not be at risk. That, in brief, was how the Court 
fashioned a compromise between the Charter’s aspirations for the protection of 
rights and the inevitability of limits on review. In Gosselin, however, Arbour J. 
re-examined those assumptions and proposed a transformative interpretation of 
section 7. In her view, the Court deveoped a(n) “habitual” interpretation of the 
guarantee after the Motor Vehicle Reference, which constructed a “firewall” 
against positive rights under section 7.19 For the purpose of this section, the 
point is that the Motor Vehicle’s interpretation of the guarantee was rooted in 
respect for the institutional boundaries between courts and legislatures. 
Whether to preserve such firewalls and boundaries or to remove them from the 
definition of section 7 depends, as a result, on the force of institutional 
considerations. 
More generally, Gosselin raised the question whether it is appropriate for the 
Court to impose positive obligations on governments in areas of democratic 
governance such as welfare policy. The Charter primarily protects negative 
entitlements, which deny governments the authority to infringe its rights and 
freedoms.20 There, the conventional remedy for an unjustifiable violation is 
negative, rather than positive in nature; that is to say, unconstitutional statutory 
provisions and actions by the state are ordinarily invalidated. Accordingly, the 
Court has recognized, on at least some occasions, that it would be unwise to 
read positive obligations into the Charter’s guarantees. For instance, R. v. 
Prosper rejected the suggestion that governments are required, under section 
10(b)’s right to counsel guarantee, to provide duty counsel to those arrested or 
detained.21 In doing so, Lamer C.J. held that “it would be a very big step for this 
Court to interpret the Charter in a manner which imposes a positive 
constitutional obligation on governments.”22 Any such decision “would almost 
certainly interfere with governments’ allocation of limited resources by 
requiring them to expend public funds on the provision of a service.”23 
                                                                                                                                                              
18
  Id., at 1177. 
19
  Gosselin, supra, note 4, at para. 309. 
20
 The Charter protects a small number of affirmative entitlements, such as minority lan-
guage rights under ss. 16 to 23, and the right to an interpreter in criminal proceedings, which is 
provided for by s. 14.  
21
  [1994] 3 S.C.R. 236. 
22
  Id., at 267 (emphasis in original). 
23
  Id. 
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In other cases, however, the Court has imposed positive obligations without 
hesitation. Under section 15 alone, a partial list of key decisions includes 
Schacter v. Canada; Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General); Vriend 
v. Alberta and, more recently in the B.C. Court of Appeal, Auton (Guardian ad 
Litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney General).24 Elsewhere the Court has 
recognized a right of access to government property under section 2(b)25 and 
otherwise imposed positive obligations on governments in the Provincial 
Judges Case; G.(J.) v. New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community 
Services), and Dunmore v. Ontario (Attorney General).26 Its decisions in 
Schacter, Eldridge, Auton, the Provincial Judges Case, and G.(J.) placed 
burdens on government finances. In Vriend, the Court did not obligate Alberta 
to add sexual orientation to the grounds of discrimination prohibited by its 
human rights legislation, but judicially amended the statute instead. 
Subsequently, Dunmore v. Ontario imposed a positive obligation on the 
province, but granted Ontario a period of grace in which to decide how it would 
comply with the Court’s directive. Finally, though it did not arise under the 
Charter, the Québec Secession Reference speaks to the question of positive 
obligations and institutional boundaries.27 There, the Court relied on unwritten 
principles to create a duty to engage in negotiations to amend the Constitution. 
After inventing this duty to negotiate, the Court declined to define its content, 
in deference to the institutional boundaries which separate law and politics. 
It is difficult to exclude positive rights and obligations from the Charter 
because the distinction between the two is not persuasive. From an entitlement 
perspective, it matters little whether the claim imposes a negative constraint or 
positive requirement on the state. What does matter is its substance and, 
institutional considerations aside, claims which require the state to take action 
can be as compelling as those which prohibit it from doing so. Not only that, it 
can also be difficult to characterize an entitlement. For example, section 11(b) 
protects a defendant’s negative right not to be denied a trial within a reasonable 
time and, at the same time, imposes an obligation on the state to provide such a 
trial. The same guarantee also demonstrates that it is unsound to assume that 
enforcing negative entitlements is without institutional consequences. In R. v. 
Askov criminal proceedings were stayed because the accused was denied his 
right to a trial within a reasonable time.28 Across the system, that one precedent 
                                                                                                                                                              
24
  Supra, note 3. 
25
  See, e.g., Canada (Attorney General) v. Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada, 
[1991] ; and Ramsden v. Peterborough (City of) (recognizing a right of access to government 
property, for expressive purposes, under s. 2(b) of the Charter). 
26
  Supra, note 3. 
27
  Reference re Secession of Québec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217. 
28
  [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199. 
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had enormous impact on fiscal policy: thousands of charges were stayed in 
Ontario alone, and to avoid further chaos in law enforcement, the government 
was forced to inject significant sums of money into the justice system.  
The institutional fallout from the enforcement of Askov’s negative 
entitlement does not suggest that similar considerations can be ignored in cases 
involving positive rights or obligations. The lesson of Askov is that the Court 
ignores the question of institutional boundaries at its own peril. Yet it 
continues, undeterred, to gloss over considerations which might otherwise 
preclude a “just outcome.” In Eldridge v. British Columbia, the Court held that 
the Charter does apply to hospitals, and that section 15 guarantees the right to 
sign language interpretation in health care services.29 Acknowledging that the 
choice and funding of such services is a government prerogative would have 
required the Court to dismiss the rights of the deaf, and that it was not prepared 
to do. Though the imposition of a positive obligation was unprecedented, La 
Forest J. proceeded as though the case was straightforward. He characterized 
the institutional concerns arising from a positive obligation to provide the 
service as inconsequential: because the estimated cost of providing sign 
language interpretation was only $150,000, the refusal to spend “such a 
relatively insignificant sum” could not constitute a minimum impairment of 
equality rights.30 Likewise, he rejected the suggestion that sign language 
interpretation could not meaningfully be distinguished from other unfunded 
services, as “purely speculative.”31 The province had presented no evidence that 
“this type of accommodation, if extended to other government services, 
[would] unduly strain the fiscal resources of the state.”32  
In this, La Forest J. accepted that at some point, the constitutionalization of 
positive obligations could strain the fiscal resources of the state. Short of a 
“strain,” however, he assumed that the Court is entitled to set constitutional 
standards on questions of democratic policy. According to Eldridge, then, 
decisions affecting the allocation of resources are subject to the Charter, except 
when the fiscal integrity of the state is at stake. This line of reasoning is 
problematic, though, because it treats the consequences of imposing positive 
obligations as an isolated phenomenon, which is limited in significance to the 
circumstances of a particular case. An approach that assumes the consequences 
are discrete allows the Court to minimize their importance. As a result, the 
cumulative or systemic impact of such obligations can be avoided, and might 
never be addressed. 
                                                                                                                                                              
29
  Eldridge, supra, note 3. 
30
  Id., at 686-87. 
31
  Id. 
32
  Id., at 689. 
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Subsequent decisions in G.(J.) v. New Brunswick and Auton v. British 
Columbia confirm that the imposition of positive obligations is not an isolated 
phenomenon, and that the momentum in their favour builds with every 
decision.33 In G.(J.) the Court imposed an unprecedented and potentially far-
reaching obligation to provide state-funded counsel in child custody 
proceedings. Against the decision in R. v. Prosper, Lamer C.J. emphasized that 
the entitlement would only crystallize in specific circumstances and that the 
budgetary implications of the Court’s decision were minimal.34 And, as the 
more recent B.C. Court of Appeal decision in Auton demonstrates, the claim in 
Eldridge was not unique.35 In imposing an obligation to fund special treatment 
for children suffering from autism, the B.C. Court of Appeal declared, albeit 
equivocally, that “the principle that government moneys should be allocated 
only by the legislature, while strong, does not always prevail when the issue is 
compliance with the Constitution.”36 It was a short step from that proposition to 
the conclusion that the resource implications of funding treatment for autism 
were not “so extraordinary” as to defeat the claim.37 When the Court finds the 
claim compelling, institutional boundaries and the cost implications of 
imposing positive obligations do not matter. 
Even without placing a burden on resources, positive rights have 
implications for the boundaries of review. In Dunmore v. Ontario, the Court 
imposed an obligation on Ontario to guarantee the meaningful exercise of 
associational freedom within the private sector group of agricultural workers. 
Justice Bastarache dismissed an unprecedented extension of judicial authority 
into the legislative domain with the remark that, “[i]f ... this Court is imposing 
‘positive’ obligations on the state, that is only because such imposition is 
justified in the circumstances.”38 In Gosselin, Arbour J. relied heavily on 
Dunmore as authority for the proposition that state action is not required to 
establish a breach of the Charter’s positive rights. It was sufficient, in her view, 
that Québec failed to take positive steps to guarantee the applicant’s security of 
the person. Though Dunmore did not have resource implications, it provided 
strong authority for the Gosselin dissent, which did. 
The decision in Vriend v. Alberta also raised concerns about the legitimacy 
and boundaries of review. There, the Court was not content to impose a positive 
                                                                                                                                                              
33
  Supra, note 3. 
34
  Id., at 93 (stating that the right to a fair trial outweighed the “relatively modest sums” at 
issue in the appeal, and that the province’s policy not to provide funding would only result in an 
unconstitutional hearing “in rare cases”). 
35
  Supra, note 3. 
36
  Id., at 437. 
37
  Id. 
38
  Dunmore, supra, note 3, at para. 29. 
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obligation on Alberta to protect its gay community from discrimination. It went 
one step further and added sexual orientation to the human rights legislation by 
judicial amendment. Perhaps in anticipation of a negative reaction, Iacobucci J. 
lamented that “hardly a day goes by without some comment or criticism to the 
effect that under the Charter the courts are wrongfully usurping the role of the 
legislatures.”39 In his view, such criticism “misunderstands what took place and 
what was intended” when Canada adopted the Charter.40 Following Lamer J.’s 
lead in the Motor Vehicle Reference, Iacobucci J. reminded critics that the 
courts only assumed new powers of review through “the deliberate choice of 
our provincial and federal legislatures.”41 It was “the Canadian people through 
their elected representatives,” not the courts, that chose judicial review “as part 
of a redefinition of our democracy.”42 From his perspective it was unfair for the 
public to complain about the Charter, after the fact. 
Some criticisms of the Court and its interpretation of the Charter may be fair, 
and some may not. In either case the judges have little choice but to confront 
the question of institutional boundaries. Ignoring, dismissing, minimizing or 
deflecting this aspect of review does not advance its legitimacy. Instead, that 
legitimacy depends on the Court’s willingness to respect institutional 
boundaries, and that is why its decision in Gosselin v. Québec is so striking. 
Though the boundaries between courts and legislatures were at the forefront in 
this case, no member of the Court gave the question serious consideration. 
Justice Bastarache, alone, voiced some concerns in denying a remedy for the 
violation of section 15, as well as in rejecting the section 7 claim on its merits. 
III. HUMAN DIGNITY METHODOLOGY AND THE REASONABLE 
WELFARE RECIPIENT 
Louise Gosselin brought an action on behalf of all welfare recipients under 
age 30 who were subject to the differential in benefits between the years 1985 
and 1989. She sought an order requiring the province of Québec to pay the 
75,000 unnamed members of the class an amount in the order of $389 million, 
along with the interest that had accrued since 1985.43 According to Bastarache 
J., the government could have been required to pay nearly half a billion dollars 
under section 24(1) of the Charter.44 Though he found a breach of section 15 
                                                                                                                                                              
39
  [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, at 562-63. 
40
  Id. 
41
  Id., at 563. 
42
  Id., at 564. 
43
  Gosselin, supra, note 4, at para. 4. 
44
  Id., at para. 297. 
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which could not be justified under section 1, he denied a remedy in damages, in 
part, for institutional reasons.45 The cost, he acknowledged, would have a 
“significant impact on the government’s fiscal situation, and potentially on the 
general economy of the province of Québec.”46  
Meanwhile, and though the claim openly challenged the boundaries of 
review, the Chief Justice’s majority opinion disregarded the issue. She had little 
difficulty rejecting the challenge, but not because she found it inappropriate for 
the Court to decide how welfare benefits should be distributed. Chief Justice 
McLachlin was determined, instead, to explain why Gosselin’s section 15 claim 
was without merit. Though the scheme treated individuals unequally on the 
basis of their age, she held that it did not violate equality because the claimant 
failed the standard of the reasonable welfare recipient. 
The majority opinion explained that Gosselin could not complain about a 
program that was designed to enhance rather than to detract from her human 
dignity. Far from marginalizing their circumstances, the age distinction was a 
dignity enhancing measure for those in the claimant’s age group. The Chief 
Justice declared that the participation incentive “worked towards the realization 
of goals that go to the heart of the equality guarantee: self-determination, 
personal autonomy, self-respect, feelings of self-worth, and empowerment.”47 
These are “the stuff and substance,” as she put it, of “essential human 
dignity.”48 Under this logic, treating those under 30 differently was “intimately 
and inextricably linked to the essential human dignity that animates the equality 
guarantee.”49 
As a result, the Chief Justice concluded that a reasonable person in 
Gosselin’s circumstances would not have “experienced” the program as 
discriminatory.50 To the contrary, the purpose of Québec’s age distinction “is a 
factor that a reasonable person in the position of the complainant would take 
into account in determining whether the legislator was treating him or her as 
less worthy and less deserving of concern, respect and consideration than 
others.”51 The Chief Justice reiterated the point by adding that, “if a law is 
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  Id. 
46
  Id. 
47
  Id., at para. 65. From Bastarache J.’s perspective, “[t]he fact that people on social assis-
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affects them negatively may pose a greater threat to their human dignity”; id., at para. 238. Accord-
ingly, it was no answer to “inferior differential treatment” that “the government claims that the 
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  Id. 
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  Id. 
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76  Supreme Court Law Review (2003), 20 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
 
Job name: SCLR vol 20   CRA             Date: Tuesday, March 06, 2012 
designed to promote the claimant’s long-term autonomy and self-sufficiency, a 
reasonable person in the claimant’s position would be less likely to view it as 
an assault on her inherent human dignity.”52 
She also addressed the effects of the program in considering “how a 
reasonable person in the claimant’s position would have viewed the 
government program.”53 There, the Chief Justice held that a reasonable person 
in her circumstances would not have perceived that the government’s efforts to 
equip her with training, rather than simply give her a monthly stipend, denied 
her human dignity.54 In the circumstances, a reasonable welfare recipient might 
have found the program harsh, but she “would not reasonably have concluded 
that it treated younger people as less worthy or less deserving of respect.”55 As 
a result, it did not violate the “essential human dignity” of welfare recipients 
under 30.56 
Freighting the prima facie question of breach with misconceived debates 
about whose perception of human dignity is reasonable subtracts from, rather 
than adds to, any plausible interpretation of the entitlement. It is the 
government’s justification of different treatment, not the claim of a right to 
equal treatment, that must be reasonable. Thus, by applying the standard of a 
reasonable welfare recipient, Gosselin demonstrates how far the jurisprudence 
has wandered from any coherent conception of equality. How an individual 
reacts to unequal treatment is irrelevant to the question whether the government 
has infringed section 15 and must justify its action under section 1. By 
dismissing the claims of those whose response to different treatment is 
unreasonable, the Chief Justice’s human rights methodology introduced an 
element of fault or blame into the constitutional analysis. Instead of asking 
whether the government’s program violated Gosselin’s right not to be treated 
unequally because of her age, the Chief Justice inferred that the applicant and 
others were at fault for not understanding that, despite treating them differently 
and less well, the scheme had their best interests in mind. 
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Not only did the majority opinion’s focus on section 15 further distort the 
Court’s definition of equality, it transformed the section 1 and institutional 
considerations at stake into an irrelevance. Functionally, the Chief Justice’s 
elaborate human dignity methodology served as a substitute for the justification 
of limits that is required by section 1. As a result, Gosselin buried concerns 
about the judicial management of welfare policy in the language of human 
dignity and the reasonable welfare recipient. Specifically, a section 1 analysis 
was incorporated into the “contextual inquiries” that are an essential part of the 
Law test. To determine whether a distinction is discriminatory, Law requires 
courts to consider the relationship between the different treatment and those 
who are affected by it.57 The question in Gosselin was whether age, as a ground 
of distinction, was related to the characteristics and circumstances of those 
under age 30.58 In concrete terms, this part of the contextual inquiry asked 
whether it was reasonable for Québec to treat those individuals unequally by 
subjecting them to this distinction. If it was not evident before, the majority 
opinion in Gosselin made it clear that this part of the Law test ignores the 
Charter’s distinction between breach and justification. 
The first branch of the Oakes test, which requires a sufficiently substantial 
and pressing objective to warrant the breach, was swept into the section 15 
analysis through the Chief Justice’s concerted defence of the purpose and 
effects of the program. Repeatedly, she spoke of its laudatory purpose, before 
stating that it would be impossible to conclude that the program “lacked 
sufficient foundation in reality and common sense to fall within the bounds of 
permissible discretion in establishing and fine-tuning a complex social 
assistance scheme.”59 This is without a doubt the language of justification. 
It then remained to build a modified version of the proportionality test into 
this branch of the contextual inquiry under section 15. In commencing that 
analysis, the Chief Justice noted that a law that is “closely tailored to the reality 
of the affected group” is unlikely to discriminate within the meaning of section 
15(1).60 She continued to invoke section 1 concepts, stating that the Charter 
does not require perfect correspondence between a benefit program and the 
circumstances of those affected.61 Without hesitation, the Chief Justice then 
went on to apply section 1’s rational connection test. Accordingly, she found 
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  One aspect of Law’s contextual inquiry examines the relationship between the ground up-
on which the claim is based and the nature of the differential treatment. See Law v. Canada (Minister 
of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497, at 537. 
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  Gosselin, supra, note 4, at para. 37. 
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that as long as the age chosen is “reasonably related to the legislative goal,” the 
fact that a different age might have been chosen “does not indicate a lack of 
sufficient correlation between the distinction and those affected by it.”62 The 
majority opinion’s blurring of breach and justification is further revealed in the 
conclusion that the legislature’s assumptions were “reasonably grounded in 
everyday experience and common sense.”63 Moreover, and though the 
soundness of its assumptions should not enter the question of breach, the Chief 
Justice worried that a violation of section 15 might be inferred “from the mere 
failure of the government to prove that the assumptions upon which it 
proceeded were correct,” or that the legislator might have the “duty,” under 
section 15, to “verify all its assumptions empirically.”64 
The Court’s unflinching application of a reasonableness standard has 
troubling implications for section 15’s guarantee of equality. The Chief 
Justice’s approach narrowed the scope of the right, and embraced a standard 
that was explicitly rejected in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia.65 
There, the Supreme Court concluded that it was unsound, in principle, for the 
question of breach under section 15 to be governed by a concept of 
reasonableness. As McIntyre J. explained, that view of the right would 
exaggerate the importance of the entitlement analysis at the expense of section 
1’s requirement that violations of equality be justified by the government. 
Under the approach proposed by appellate Judge McLachlin, who was then a 
member of the B.C. Court of Appeal, “virtually no role would be left for 
section 1.”66 To preserve the structural integrity of the Charter, Andrews held 
that “the right guaranteeing sections” must be kept “analytically separate from 
section 1.”67 Against that admonition, the majority opinion in Gosselin 
transparently conducted a reasonable limits analysis under section 15. 
By transforming the issue of reasonable limits into a question of entitlement, 
the majority opinion ignored the institutional dynamics of the claim. In doing 
so, it created the impression that the challenge failed on a point of evidence, 
and not because there might be limits on the judiciary’s authority to supervise 
the allocation of resources dedicated to welfare benefits.68 In this, the majority 
opinion reveals a worrying disregard of the boundaries that both limit and 
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secure the legitimacy of review. Nor did the Chief Justice’s treatment of the 
section 7 issue compensate for her inattention to the question of institutional 
function under section 15. In answer to Arbour J.’s passionate re-interpretation 
of section 7, she was content to provide a checklist of the doctrinal obstacles 
that would have to be addressed, before dismissing the claim on evidentiary 
grounds. In her view, it sufficed to declare that the “frail platform provided by 
the facts of the case” could not sustain a “positive state obligation of citizen 
support.”69
IV. RIGHTS OF PERFORMANCE UNDER SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER 
To call it radical would not overstate Arbour J.’s interpretation of section 7: 
her version of the guarantee would allow individuals to claim positive 
entitlements, including, in Gosselin’s case, the right to minimum welfare 
benefits. In proposing this conception of entitlement, she faced formidable 
obstacles in the jurisprudence. Yet Arbour J. maintained that the Court had 
“consistently chosen” to leave open the possibility of a right to basic means of 
subsistence under section 7.70 She also claimed that, far from resisting it, the 
language and structure of the Charter compelled that conclusion. Still, she 
acknowledged the need to “deconstruct the various firewalls” that precluded the 
Court from reaching an “inevitable and just” outcome in Gosselin’s case.71 
Since the Motor Vehicle Reference, it has been accepted that the purpose of 
section 7 is to protect the rights of individuals in the justice system.72 Under 
that view, the entitlements to life, liberty and security of the person, which are 
set out in the provision’s first clause, are guaranteed, but only against 
deprivations which violate principles of fundamental justice. Those principles, 
which fall in the inherent domain of the judiciary, relate to the administration of 
justice, and not to policies which belong, as a matter of prerogative, to the 
democratic branches of government. The Court arrived at this interpretation of 
section 7 by reading its two clauses together to derive a single right, which is 
further constrained by the requirements of a deprivation by the state and a link 
to the justice system. 
In Gosselin, however, the claimant asked the Court to recognize a 
substantive entitlement that directly challenged legislative policy and, in doing 
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so, fell entirely outside the justice system. That claim could not succeed under 
the existing interpretation of the guarantee. To overcome that obstacle, Arbour 
J. explained why it was unsound, in her view, to exclude rights of performance 
from the scope of section 7. To establish free-standing rights under the 
guarantee’s first clause, it was necessary for her to resurrect the two-rights 
theory. This freed the right from its anchor in the fundamental justice clause, 
and in a process of law. By doing so, she eliminated the principles of 
fundamental justice from her definition of breach, and also found it 
unnecessary for the claimant to establish a deprivation by the state. Reading 
those constraints out of the guarantee removed the obstacles to her theory of 
positive rights. As a result of this analysis, her conception of section 7 would 
impose positive obligations which could vest and be enforced in the absence of 
any action by the state. By re-imagining the guarantee this way, she reached the 
conclusion that Québec’s failure to provide minimum benefits infringed 
Gosselin’s security of the person.  
In advancing her interpretation of section 7, Arbour J. reasoned from logic: 
the overlooked logic of the text; the logic she drew from the case law; and the 
logic of reading this provision of the Charter to include a positive dimension 
and rights of performance. Yet there was an omission in Arbour J.’s attempt to 
re-invent section 7 of the Charter. Though her conception of entitlement might 
be persuasive in substantive terms, it failed to consider the question of 
boundaries. As the discussion above explained, that question must be 
confronted in any attempt to define the scope of section 7. 
Even as a matter of logic, Arbour J.’s analysis struggled to establish a right 
to minimum subsistence. Under the prevailing view that section 7 protects a 
single right, the entitlements of life, liberty and security of the person lack 
substantive content or status apart from the fundamental justice clause. Her 
response to that was to proclaim, boldly and to the contrary, that the 
guarantee’s first clause should be read as “providing for a completely 
independent and self-standing right, one which can be violated even absent a 
breach of fundamental justice.”73 Against “a general impression that section 7 is 
reduced to the right contained in the second clause,”74 she insisted that “the 
section’s first clause affords some additional protection, over and above that 
afforded in the second clause.”75  
To minimize the authority of the jurisprudence, Arbour J. invoked the plain 
words of the text. According to her, the Court “habitually read out of the 
English version of section 7 the conjunction and, with it, the entire first 
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clause.”76 Though section 7 had “habitually been read” a certain way, an 
unauthoritative interpretation could not override the plain words of the 
guarantee.77 For her, the conclusion that the first clause must afford protection 
beyond that guaranteed by the principles of fundamental justice was a “purely 
textual matter.”78 Moreover, the jurisprudence did not preclude this 
interpretation of section 7, because the Court had never determinatively 
resolved the status of “self-standing” rights in the first clause. Instead, it 
became preoccupied with the criminal justice system following Motor Vehicle 
Reference, and section 7’s first clause, together with the two-rights theory, 
began to slip into “relative obscurity.”79 As a result, the right to life, liberty and 
security of the person, apart from any connection with the administration of 
justice, had neither been confirmed nor rejected by the Court.80 It was as if an 
accident of interpretation had placed those entitlements in limbo throughout 
section 7’s evolution.  
Far from being a radical shift, Arbour J. presented her conception of the 
guarantee as a return to the text. Reviving the conjunction between section 7’s 
two clauses meant that the provision guaranteed two rights after all, and 
confirmed that its first clause protects independent, substantive rights. This, in 
turn, eliminated the need for a link to the justice system, as well as the 
requirement of active interference by the state. Once those constraints were 
removed, the unrestricted language of life, liberty and security of the person 
easily accommodated positive rights. As Arbour J. observed, “there is no sense 
in which the actual language of section 7 limits its application to circumstances 
where there has been positive state interference.”81 And, under a conception of 
the guarantee that protects two rights, not one, section 7 is “bereft of any trace 
of language that might contain a requirement of positive state action before a 
breach may occur.”82 
Context provided further support for this interpretation of section 7. For 
instance, the right to life explained why positive rights should not be excluded 
from the guarantee. It would violate “basic standards of interpretation,” Arbour 
J. contended, for the Charter to protect a complex of rights and freedoms, and 
then deny substantive content to “the one right that is indispensable” to the 
enjoyment of the rest.83 Yet an interpretation that treated the right to life as a 
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negative entitlement, violated only when life is deprived, would impugn “the 
coherence of the whole Charter.”84 Because to deny that most fundamental 
entitlement “any real significance” would undercut every other Charter 
guarantee, it logically followed that section 7 must protect “something more 
than merely negative rights.”85 Madam Justice Arbour also found support for 
the recognition of positive rights in sections 8 to 14. Contrary to what may be 
assumed, she suggested that the context of the legal rights “favours the 
conclusion” that a positive duty to act can be imposed on the state under section 
7.86 If other provisions entrench positive rights, as some do, then “one should 
also expect that section 7 rights would also contain a positive dimension.”87  
Though she had more difficulty with the doctrinal constraints on section 7, 
Arbour J. challenged the rigidity of the requirements that there be a link to the 
justice system and a deprivation by the state. Citing “recent cases,” “recent 
developments,” and “the more recent turn in the section 7 jurisprudence,” she 
claimed that a legalistic reliance on the “Legal Rights” subheading had been 
“supplanted” by a purposive and contextual approach.88 In her view, Blencoe v. 
British Columbia (Human Rights Commission)89 and Winnipeg Child and 
Family Services v. K.L.W.90 relaxed “any supposed requirement” that the claim 
relate to the administration of criminal justice.91 She also cited G.(J.) v. New 
Brunswick, and warned against “the temptation to dilute the obvious 
significance” of the Court’s decision to impose a positive obligation to provide 
state-funded counsel in child custody proceedings.92 There, however, Lamer 
C.J. had warned against granting security of the person a broad sweep. As he 
explained, “countless government initiatives” could be challenged on the 
ground that they infringe this right, “massively expanding the scope of judicial 
review” as a result and, in the process, “trivializing what it means for a right to 
be constitutionally protected.”93 The security interest in Gosselin could not be 
linked to any process of law, and nor could the applicant point to any action by 
the state that interfered with her security of the person. Because either or both 
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elements were present in the existing case law, the analogies Arbour J. drew 
were not strong. Gosselin’s claim was unarguably without precedent. 
Dunmore v. Ontario, which was discussed above, provided the strongest 
support for her theory of positive rights under section 7.94 In Dunmore, 
Bastarache J. imposed a positive obligation on  
the province of Ontario to protect the meaningful exercise of associational 
freedom, though the government had done nothing to infringe the section 2(d) 
rights of agricultural workers. As Arbour J. stated in Gosselin, not including 
agricultural workers in a comprehensive labour relations scheme violated their 
freedom of association because section 2(d) protects a “positive right to 
legislative inclusion.”95 Through the convolution that “the state cannot shield 
itself from Charter scrutiny under the pretext that underinclusive legislation 
does not constitute active interference with a fundamental freedom,” Dunmore 
confirmed for Arbour J. that the Charter protects positive rights.96 Accordingly, 
she held in Gosselin that the government need not actively interfere with rights 
to be in breach of the Charter.97 Citing Dunmore and the positive right to the 
meaningful exercise of associational freedom, she held that the government’s 
failure to provide minimum benefits in Gosselin’s case “substantially 
impede[d]” the enjoyment of her section 7 rights.98 
Justice Bastarache strenuously resisted the suggestion that the claims in 
Dunmore and Gosselin were analogous. In doing so, he acknowledged that 
section 7 can extend to situations outside the traditional criminal context, 
though only in exceptional circumstances. Still, he insisted on a link between 
an individual’s security of the person and the justice system or its 
administration. Moreover, he maintained that “[a]t the very least, a section 7 
claim must arise from determinative state action that in and of itself deprives 
the applicant of one of section 7’s entitlements.”99 In the absence of “this 
threshold requirement,” he feared that “the legitimacy of the entire process of 
Charter adjudication” would be brought into question.100 If his attempt to 
distinguish Dunmore’s positive obligation was unpersuasive, Bastarache J.’s 
concerns about Gosselin’s rights of performance under section 7 are well-
founded.101 
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Lost in Arbour J.’s goal of returning to the text and overcoming doctrinal 
constraints was any recognition that section 7’s interpretation is based on 
respect for institutional boundaries. Her dissent eliminated limits on the scope 
of the guarantee, but showed little or no concern about the institutional 
implications of doing so. In a brief discussion which conceded that courts are 
“ill-equipped” to address matters of resource allocation, she stated that the 
state’s obligation to provide basic means of subsistence raises “altogether a 
different claim.”102 Though she agreed that the Court could not allocate the 
resources that were needed to satisfy the right, she saw no problem in deciding 
whether the entitlement existed. She declared that “any concern over the 
justiciability of positive claims against the state has little bearing” in Gosselin’s 
case, because Québec had already established a basic level of welfare 
benefits.103 
Subsequently, in explaining why a fundamental justice analysis was not 
required on the facts of the case, Arbour J. indirectly addressed the question of 
boundaries. She observed that in Gosselin’s case, the source of the violation 
was the legislative process and the realm of public policy. According to the 
case law, however, the Court had “specifically divorced” legislative policy 
from the principles of fundamental justice, and their concern with the justice 
system.104 In her view it was appropriate, then, to proceed directly from a 
breach of security of the person to the question of reasonable limits under 
section 1. The principles of fundamental justice were irrelevant because 
Gosselin’s claim invoked “the inherent domain of the legislature and not that of 
the justice system.”105 In this way, she openly claimed a power of review that 
had been carefully disavowed, both in the Motor Vehicle Reference and in the 
subsequent case law. By dismissing the distinction between the judicial and 
legislative realms, she rejected the foundational assumption of the section 7 
jurisprudence. It is significant, too, that her theory of positive rights relied on 
the unrestricted language of the guarantee’s first clause. As such, it neither 
contemplated nor identified limits on the scope of the right or the power of 
review under that section of the Charter. The implications of this are 
underscored by the section 1 analysis, which can only save a breach of section 
7 in rare cases.106  
Madam Justice Arbour’s dissent disregards the question of boundaries on 
review. Nowhere did she place parameters on the free-standing rights her 
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interpretation of section 7 would protect. To the contrary, she indicated, quite 
forthrightly, that her purpose was to breathe positive rights into the Charter. 
Thus, she argued that if section 7 rights include a positive dimension, “such that 
they are not merely rights of ‘non-interference’ but also what might be 
described as rights of ‘performance,’ then they may be violable by mere 
inaction or failure by the state to actively provide the conditions necessary for 
their fulfilment.”107 Later, she stated that “[c]onstitutional rights are not simply 
a shield against state interference with liberty; they place a positive obligation 
on the state to arbitrate competing demands from the liberty and rights of 
others.”108 In her view, the justificatory mechanism of section 1 “reflects the 
existence of a positive right to Charter protection” which, in a section 7 context, 
calls for the state “not only to abstain from interfering with life, liberty and 
security of the state but also to actively secure that right in the face of 
competing demands.”109 Finally, she found that to those like Gosselin, “a purely 
negative right to security of the person is essentially meaningless,” and that 
“one can reasonably conclude that positive action is what is required in order to 
breathe purpose and meaning into their section 7 guaranteed rights.”110 
Yet the impossibility of defining section 7’s rights in a principled way is 
what rendered a substantive interpretation of liberty and security of the person 
problematic in the first place. The dilemma of interpretation was this. If the 
Court defined those entitlements restrictively, it would have been criticized for 
singling certain values out for favourable treatment. It could only avoid that 
criticism by extending section 7’s reach to a broad range of liberty and security 
interests. The problem there, however, was one of boundaries, and an inability 
to legitimize a power of review that interfered on that scale with the functions 
of the elected branches of government.111 The Motor Vehicle Reference gave 
section 7 a substantive interpretation, but Lamer J. contended it did not threaten 
the legitimacy of Charter adjudication, because the administration of justice 
criterion observed the institutional boundaries of review. There, the Court 
resolved this dilemma by fashioning a compromise between the substantive 
entitlement and the need to respect boundaries. 
It is a fair point that the Motor Vehicle Reference’s distinction between the 
inherent domain of the judiciary and the policy process is difficult to defend. 
After the Court began to constitutionalize the substantive definition of mens 
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rea, the distinction between justice and policy became especially awkward. 
Though new strains of fundamental justice have been added over the years, the 
Court has been cautious about expanding the guarantee’s substantive content. 
By the same token, the administration of justice criterion and requirement of a 
deprivation place limits on the scope of the guarantee that may seem arbitrary 
or unprincipled.  
That said, it is unclear that Arbour J.’s attempt to free section 7 from the 
fundamental justice constraint is a step in the right direction. Protecting 
entitlements selectively through section 7’s concept of security of the person 
underscores the subjectivity inherent in any attempt to limit positive, 
substantive rights on the basis of their content. Though singling certain aspects 
of liberty or security out for constitutional protection underscores the 
subjectivity of review and reflects adversely on its legitimacy, an open-ended 
definition of the first clause is unworkable. Under the Gosselin dissent’s 
unrestricted interpretation, however, individuals would be entitled to challenge 
every interference with their liberty or security of the person and to claim that 
the state’s failure to secure those entitlements violated the Charter. Justice 
Arbour’s rights of performance would include, and potentially render 
justiciable, any form of inaction on the state’s part that substantially impedes 
security of the person. In this, her interpretation of section 7 contemplates a 
power of review that would dramatically exceed the Motor Vehicle’s initiative. 
Under her conception of the right, institutional boundaries would not only be 
crossed, but eliminated.  
V. PUTTING JUDICIAL REVIEW IN ITS INSTITUTIONAL PLACE 
Gosselin v. Québec bristles with issues that cannot be adequately examined 
within the constraints of this paper. One such issue, which has not been 
addressed in the discussion above, concerns the status of underinclusiveness as 
a breach of the Charter, apart from section 15. There, it is questionable whether 
the conception of underinclusion should be employed to incorporate positive 
rights and obligations into other guarantees, such as sections 2(d) or 7. Justice 
Arbour’s proposal to do so was especially problematic in the circumstances of 
Gosselin, where the infringement fell squarely within section 15 and should 
have been adjudicated, exclusively, under the equality guarantee.  
The majority opinion’s definition of equality raises another point for 
discussion. The suggestion that a section 15 claim must be reasonable was 
followed by the Court in Law v. Canada, and the standard of the reasonable 
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claimant has been applied in other cases.112 In requiring the Court to determine 
whether it was reasonable for the human dignity of welfare recipients to be 
offended by their exclusion from benefits, Gosselin confirmed how tortuous 
and beside the point this methodology has become. At this point in time, 
however, the Court is committed to Law’s dogma of human dignity.113 
The majority opinion’s intransigent attachment to Law invites comparison 
with Arbour J.’s willingness to challenge the Motor Vehicle Reference and re-
imagine the conceptual underpinnings of section 7. Whatever its substantive 
merits may be, the unresolved difficulty of her theory of positive rights in 
Gosselin is that it opened up the legitimacy issue which had, for the most part, 
been laid to rest by the Motor Vehicle and the doctrinal constraints it imposed 
on section 7. Unfortunately, Arbour J. chose to deflect, rather than confront, the 
questions of institutional boundaries that were inherent in her proposal for 
section 7. Yet for the reasons outlined above, that question must unavoidably 
inform any attempt to grant the guarantee a substantive interpretation. 
Gosselin placed institutional considerations at issue in two ways. First, and 
whether under section 15 or 7, the claim invited the Court to constitutionalize 
welfare policy and impose a positive obligation on Québec to provide adequate 
or equal benefits. The majority opinion rejected the claim, however, without 
once acknowledging that the entitlement crossed the boundary which separates 
judicial and democratic functions. For the Court to ignore this element of the 
analysis is particularly disturbing in the circumstances of the case. Four judges 
wrote powerful dissents in support of the entitlement and none, in doing so, 
viewed the question of institutional relations as particularly important, much 
less as an obstacle to the claim. Nor does the unavailability of a remedy answer 
or explain this omission. Consequently, Gosselin sends a message that the 
question of institutional boundaries is not part of the analysis when the Court is 
deciding whether to impose a positive obligation, with resource implications, 
on a government. 
Second, the Arbour dissent highlights the institutional questions which 
inescapably burden the definition of section 7. The question is unavoidable, in 
the case of this guarantee, because its entitlements are, in substantive terms, 
without limit. For that reason, any attempt to provide a substantive 
interpretation must address the issue of definitional limits. With all the criticism 
it has attracted, the Motor Vehicle Reference recognized the need for 
                                                                                                                                                              
112
  Law, supra, note 57, at 550; see Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950, at para. 55 (apply-
ing that standard to the circumstances of Métis communities excluded from participation in a program 
directing casino proceeds to other Aboriginal communities). 
113
  C. Bredt and A. Dodek, “Breaking the Law’s Grip on Equality: A New Paradigm for Sec-
tion 15” article included in this volume (providing a critique of this methodology and offering a 
proposal for reform). 
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constraints on the scope of the guarantee. By contrast, Arbour J.’s dissent in 
Gosselin did not. As a result, her theory of positive rights cannot be assessed 
until the question of definitional limits is addressed. 
More generally, Gosselin demonstrates how easy it is for the judges to 
ignore or dismiss institutional questions which might require them to recognize 
limits on the scope of Charter rights, as well as on their own powers of review. 
Thus far, the Court has been content, in a variety of circumstances which 
invited the judiciary to impose positive obligations, to minimize the 
implications of extending their authority over the democratic branches of 
government. For instance, the Motor Vehicle Reference only accepted 
constraints on the scope of section 7 to justify an interpretation the guarantee 
was never intended to have. In other settings, the Court has been quick to 
downplay the consequences of expanding its role at the expense of the other 
branches of government. 
This paper does not explain precisely how the Court should answer the 
question of institutional boundaries. That answer would be informed, initially, 
by a set of assumptions about institutional functions; in turn, these assumptions 
would have to confront fundamental issues about the role of the judiciary and 
the limits on its authority which set boundaries on review. In more concrete 
terms, the concept of boundaries could then generate principles or criteria 
which would then apply on a case-to-case basis. Meantime, the limited purpose 
of this paper has been to explain why it is imperative for the Court to include 
the question of institutional boundaries in its analysis. Instead of focusing 
exclusively on the substantive entitlement, it should consider all dimensions of 
the constitutional question at stake, before deciding the outcome. Doing so 
would not have changed the result in Gosselin, though it might have in some of 
the Court’s other decisions. Regardless, lingering doubts about the legitimacy 
of review will never be fully allayed, and nor should they be. It is inevitable, 
nonetheless, that those doubts will be aggravated by decisions which disregard 
or violate the institutional boundaries of review. 
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